Unique to multiparty mediation is the presence of coalition dynamics that may very well be in a constant state of flux. Coalition dynamics have been described as follows:

Once three or more conflicting parties are involved, coalitions may form and act in concert against the other disputants. Those left out of a coalition may often be worse off than they were before negotiations began. Unlike in bilateral negotiations, where typically one party cannot affect the other party’s BATNA, in multiparty negotiations, those left out of [the] deal may often find themselves worse off [than] if no deal were made.

Robert H. Mnookin, “Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution,” 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (2003).

BATNA is defined as a well-thought-out “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.” Fisher, Ury & Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin 2d ed. 1991).

This article identifies some of the unique elements of multiparty mediation and suggests procedures to manage them, requiring early coordinated efforts between the mediator and the parties, as well as providing cognitive coaching ideas to facilitate the mediation process.